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NEW YORK'S MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION
CORPORATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
By PETER WARD*
EFFECTIVE January 1, 1959, some victims' of New York's highway traffic are
provided with an additional corporate defendant against whom, in certain
instances, they may collect an amount "which does not exceed ten thousand
dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, on account of injury to, or death of,
one person and, subject to such limits for the death of, or injury to, any one
person, the amount hereof which does not exceed twenty thousand dollars,
exclusive of interest and costs, on account of the injury to, or death of, more
than one person in any one accident.'"
2
A new Article 17-A has been added to the New York Insurance Law.
The stated purpose is as follows:
§600. Short title and declaration of purpose. (1) This act
shall be known and may be cited as the "motor vehicle accident indemni-
fication corporation law."
(2) Declaration of purpose. The legislature finds and declares
that the motor vehicle financial security act as enacted in nineteen hun-
dred fifty-six, which requires the owner of a motor vehicle to furnish
proof of financial security as a condition to registration, fails to accom-
plish its full purpose of securing to innocent victims of motor vehicle
accidents recompense for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon
them, in that the act makes no provision for the payment of loss on
account of injury to or death of persons who, through no fault of their
own, were involved in motor vehicle accidents caused by (1) uninsured
motor vehicles registered in a state other than New York, (2) unidenti-
fied motor vehicles which leave the scene of the accident, (3) motor
vehicles registered in this state as to which at the time of the accident
there was not in effect a policy of liability insurance, (4) stolen motor
vehicles, (5) motor vehicles operated without the permission of the
owner, (6) insured motor vehicles where the insurer disclaims liability
or denies coverage, and (7) unregistered motor vehicles. The legislature
determines that it is a matter of grave concern that such innocent victims
are not recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon them
and that the public interest can but be served by dosing such gaps in
the motor vehicle financial security act through the incorporation and
operation of the motor vehicle accident indemnification corporation.
This legislation is the latest of many compromises over a span of more than
half a century. Its future is probably no more settled than its past.
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Dean Leon Green popularizes the term in his new book TRAFFic VICrIMS,
TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958).
2. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §§167(1) (e), 167(2-a), 600-626 (Cum. Supp. 1958).
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Historical Background
The lawyer and the geopolitician, alike, in analyzing American historical
development, share the need for studying her lines of communication. This meant
her canals and waterways in the first half of the nineteenth century, her railroads
in the latter half, her automobile highways and airways in the twentieth century.
Much of America's damage law has been and is being hammered out along the
tow-paths, on the grade-crossings, down the oil-marked pavements, beside the
airports. Nineteenth century America had a continent to embrace, riches to claw
out, industries to create. The cost in flesh and blood along the waterways and
railroads was a price society, by and large, was willing to pay for its rendevous
with destiny. Negligence and its concomitance, contributory negligence-liability
only for unreasonable fault, made the nineteenth, from the standpoint of damage
liability, the defendants' century.
According to the census of 1890 the western frontier was no more. America
had conquered its continent. Now it began to fill up with people, some areas
much faster than others. People and industry gravitated along the lines of com-
munication. Groups in some areas began to change their ideas regarding a proper
charge to be assessed industrial America for its necessary consumption of blood
and bones. The values that the fault-liability concept protected, in some instances,
began to suffer a depreciation. Human loss to society began to take on an economic
significance regardless of fault. The "fault" petidulum began to swing the other
way toward the plaintiffs' twentieth century. Fault, yes, but easier to find and
sometimes liability regardless of fault.
This, then, is the background out of which the Model T came chugging-
a few hundred cars on a few thousand miles of roads scattered among 80 million
people. Now 65 million multi-ton vehicles race along two and one half million
miles of speedways along side of which 175 million people live and work.
In the early part of the automobile century little thought was given to
comprehensive licensing procedures, either of the car or its driver. Safety require-
ments, when considered, were as apt to be thrust by the courts through such a
medium as a broken wheel as by the legislature in headlight and brake require-
ments. It soon became apparent that the inertial energy of the automobile far
exceeded that of the surrey. But who was to pay for the damage? Clearly
enough in those early days only the well-to-do man could afford such an "infernal
machine" and he drove it himself, or his chauffeur did. But soon he was loaning
the car to friends who were driving for their pleasure and members of his family
were borrowing it for their own errands. Fences were being broken down, pedes-
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trians and bicyclists hurt; old folks in the car and children playing in the streets
were knocked about and bones cracked; other vehicles were being involved.
At first no one disputed the insulation of the bailor from the bailee's negligence.
Soon the practical necessity for finding a solvent defendant began to eat away at
the owner's financial protection. Courts began to ask disturbing questions-was
the owner present in the car? Was the driver really on his own business or, in
some way, on the owner's? Was the son's evening date all part of a family
purpose? Had the owner made a negligent entrustment? Was this somehow
a joint enterprise? A few state legislatures were even more direct, thrusting
liability on the owner for damage negligently caused by one driving the car with
the owner's permission or consent. Henry Ford's five dollar per day wage helped
make it possible for working men to own the autos they built. Additional defend-
ants, yes, but could they pay damage claims? Millions of cars each year were now
being built. Annual traffic deaths were being counted in the tens of thousands,
the injured and maimed by the million. This toll in human life soon exceeded the
total of all of America's soldiers killed in all her wars. In the ten years from 1921
to 1930, 230,353 were killed.3 According to the Columbia Committee Report
published in 19324 with nearly 27 million cars registered in 1929, over 19
million had only the financial solvency of the owner and/or driver standing
behind the damage legally caused. Liability insurance covered only 27 per cent
of all the private passenger and commercial vehicles in America.5
The impact of such statistics as these brought legislative action along two
fronts. In 1925 and 1926 studies were carried out in Massachusetts which led
to compulsory insurance in that state, effective January 1, 1927.6 Thereafter, no
privately owned motor vehicle could be registered in that state without proof of
liability insurance coverage in the amount of $5,000, one person, $10,000, one
accident. Property damage was not included. No provision originally was made
for the damage caused by the hit-and-run or out-of-state driver. The guest
occupant was excluded from coverage. Insurance rates were set by the state.
Massachusetts still operates under a system of compulsory insurance.
At about the same time Connecticut was seeking solutions to similar problems
but along different lines. Effective January 1, 1926 Connecticut became the first
state to adopt a so-called Financial and Safety Responsibility law.7 In just over 30
3. ACCIDENT FACTS, 1931. Published annually by the National Safety Council
of Chicago.
4. REPORT BY 'THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1932) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA REPORT].
5. Id. at 45.
6. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 90, §34A-J; c. 175, §113A-G (1946).
7. CONN. PUB. ACT c. 183 (1925).
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years from that date, all but our 49th state were to adopt some variant of this
type law.8
Financial Responsibility Legislation
The legislative theory was to discover both the hazardous driver and the
financially irresponsible owner, requiring, as a condition to continued licensing,
that they post security both for damag,_ that had been done and what might be
done in the future. In most instances their future security took the form of a
liability insurance policy in the amount of $5,000 one injury, $10,000 one accident,
$1,000 property damage. Ideally these rates would be higher than those of the-
safe driver or responsible owner and this would thus have a certain prophylactic
effect.
The financially irresponsible motor vehicle owner was to be discovered by
the process of an unsatisfied judgment against him. The vehicle involved in the
accident was the particular target not all owned vehicles. Gradually such legisla-
tion began to concern itself with financially irresponsible operators as well as
owners. Other cars began to be affected. In 1937 New Hampshire became the
first state to thrust a compulsory security requirement on the operator or owner
of a motor vehicle which had merely been involved in an accident.9 This, obvi-
8. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 36, §§74(42)-74(83) (Cum. Supp. 1951); Aruz. REV.
STAT. tit. BR §§1101-1225 (1955); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 §§1401-1493 (1947);
CAL. VEH. CODE §§410-424.8; COLO. REV. STAT. c.13 tit. 7 §§1-39 (1953); CONN.
GEN. STAT. tit. 17 c.110 §2457 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 §§2901-2972
(1953); D. C. CODE tit. 40 §§417-498c (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§324.011-324.271
(1958); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 92A §§601-621 (Cum.Supp. 1958); HAwAII REv.
LAWS c. 160 §§80-139 (1955); IDA. CODE §§49-1501-49-1540 (1947); ILL. STAT.
ANN. C. 95 % §§7-101-7-502 (1958); IND. STAT. ANN. §§47-1044-47-1089 (Cum.Supp.
1952); IOWA CODE ANN. §§321A.1-321 A.39 (Cum.Supp. 1958); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§8-722-8-769 (Cum.Supp. 1957); Ky. REV. STAT. §§187.290-187.990
(1956); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 32 §§851-1043 (Cum. Supp. 1952); ME. REV. STAT.
c. 22 §§75-82 (1954); MD. CODE ANN. art. 66 'A §§116-149 (1957); MASS. LAWS ANN.
c. 90 §§3G, 22A (1946); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§9.2201-9.2232 (Cur.Supp. 1952);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§170.21-170.58 (1946); Miss. CODE ANN. §§8285-01-8285-41
(1957); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§303.010-303.340 (1952); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§53-418-
53-458 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§60-501-60-569 (1952); NEV. REv. STAT. §§485.010-
485.420 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§268:1-268:27 (1955); N. J. STAT. ANN.
§§39:6-23-39:6-91 (Cum.Supp. 1958); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. §§64-24-42-64-24-104
(Cum.Supp. 1957); N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §§94-94nn (Cum:Supp. 1952);
N.D. REV. CODE §§39-1401-39-1456 (1943); N.G. GEN. STAT. §§20-279.1-2.279.39
(Cum.Supp. 1957); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§4509.01-4509.99 (1953); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47 §§501-542 (Cum.Supp. 1950); Oar. REV. STAT. §§486.011-486.991 (Cure.
Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 §§1277.1-1277.39 (Cum.Supp. 1953); R. I., GEN.
LAws § §31-32-1-31-32-49 (1956; S.C. CODE § §46-701-46-750.33 (Cum.Supp. 1958); S.D.
STAT. c. 212 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. §§59-1201-59-1221 (1956); Ta. STAT. ANN.
art. 6701h (Cum.Supp. 1958); UTAH CODE ANN. §§41-12-1-41-12-41 (1953); VT. STAT.
§§10,163-10,172 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. §§46.1-388-46.1-514 (Cum:Supp. 1958); WASH.
REV. CODE §§46.24.010-46.28.200 (Cum.Supp. 1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§1721(482)-
1721(539) (1955); Wis. STAT. §§85.08-85.09 (1955); Wyo. COMP. STAT. §§60-1501-
60-1630 (CumSupp. 1957).
9. N.H. REV. IAws c. 122 (1942).
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ously, covered many more cars than the more limited, unsatisfied judgment require-
ment. Most states, in adopting this type regulation included some form of
administrative fact-finding to determine fault. The heart of this "one accident" as
opposed to "one judgment" type legislation was an efficient motor vehicle adminis-
tration that would be triggered into automatic operation by the due reporting
of accidents, generally based on any personal injuries or property damage exceeding
$50 (more recently raised to $100). Too often break-downs occurred both in the
reporting of the accidents and in the administration of the system.
The widespread development of these financial responsibility laws (the stress
gradually was placed here rather than on safety) called for the establishment of
standard or required clauses in the liability policies to be used as financial
security. Of particular importance were the provisions concerning cancellation
and rescission both before and after loss. Termination of the policy by the
insurer before loss had occurred created only administrative problems that
could be handled by the giving of timely notice to both the insured and the state.
Arrangement then could be made either to cancel the registration or to transfer
the risk to some form of assigned-risk pool before the policy lapsed. Difficult
questions arose when the termination was sought by the insurer after loss because
of the alleged breach of certain conditions in the policy. What should be the
interests of the injured third parties in these "required" policies? Should they
be derivative or primary? Should the type of condition violated be determinative,
i.e. a misrepresentation regarding the risk as compared to a condition requiring
the cooperation of the insured after loss? Absent any statutory enactment, the
case-law development rather generally put the injured party iii the position of.
the insured and treated the problem as a derivative one. Legislatures, on the other
hand, inclined to the view of granting primary rights in "required" policies to th&
injured party and disregarding subtle distinctions between conditions precedent
and subsequent.
In a state by state survey as of August, 1958, 38 states provided that those
"required" policies become "absolute" after loss.' 0 California, Connecticut, Florida,
10. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 36, §74(62)(f)l (Cum.Supp. 1951); ARiz. REV. STAT.
tit. 28 §1170 (1955); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 §1466(f)1 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT.
c. 13 tit. 7 §22 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 §2904(f)(1) (1953); D.C. CODE tit.
40 §473 (1951); HAwArr REV. LAws C. 160 §107 (1955); ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 95 2§7-317(f)1 (1958); IND. STAT. ANN. §47-1048 (Cum.Supp. 1952); IowA CODE ANN.§321A21(6)a (Cum.Supp. 1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8-750(f)(1) (Cum.Supp.
1957); Ky. REV. STAT. §187.490(6)(a) (1956); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 32 §900(F)(1)
(Cum.Supp. 1952); ME. REy. STAT. c. 22 §80 II A (1954); MD. CODE ANN. art. 66 A§131(a) (6) (F) (1957); MicH. STAT. ANN. §9.2220(3) (f) (1) (Cum.Supp. 1952);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §170.40(6)(1) (1946); MISS. CODE ANN. §8285-21(f)(1) (1957);
Mo. STAT. ANN. §303.190(6)(1) (1952); MONT. REv. CODE: ANN. §53-438(f)(1)(1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §60-538(1) (1952); NEV. REV. STAT. §485.3091(6)(a>
(1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §268.16(1) (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §39.6-48(a)(Cum.Supp. 1958); N. Mx. STAT. ANN. §64-24-87(f)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1957); N.Y.
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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Tennessee, and Vermont, although having financial responsibility laws, make no
provision regarding the termination after loss and presumably would handle this
as a case-law problem. Georgia" provides only that the policy cannot be cancelled
within 12 months of its effective date unless a subsequent conviction for an offense
authorizing a license revocation is involved. Idaho'2 and Wisconsin13 provide that
"The policy may not be cancelled or annulled as to such liability by any agree-
ment between the insurance, carrier and the insured (emphasis added) after the
occurrence of any injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy."
Alaska has no provisions concerning automobile liability insurance. Massachusetts' a
makes her compulsory policies absolute after loss. In 1946 Massacl.usetts added
a special financial-responsibility law for non-residents. 15 Under this legislation
these policies need not be absolute after loss. New York, although adding a
compulsory insurance law effective January 1, 1956,16 continues to maintain a
financial responsibility law which provides that the required policies be absolute
after loss." The joker here, though, is the new section 94-r of the Motor Vehicle
Law. Section 94, with all its subdivisions, is the New York Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act, formerly Article 6-A but renumbered Article 6-B1 when the
legislature adopted the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act (Compulsory Auto-
mobile Insurance) and numbered it Article 6-A. In 1957 the legislature added
section 94-r effective April 19, 1957 which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person, on and
after February first, nineteen hundred fifty-seven, shall be required to
file or maintain proof of financial responsibility pursuant to this Article.
The effect of this would seem to be that, at least under the New York Safety
Responsibility Act, there no longer are any "absolute" policies required by Article
6-B of the Motor Vehicle Law.
Even when the various state statutes stated that the policies should be "ab-
solute" after loss, what did that mean? Suppose the policy were a $100,000/300,-
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
VEHICLE AND TaAFFIc. LAw §94-q(i) (1) (Cum. Supp. 1952) But see §94-r (Cum.Supp.
1958); N.C.GEN. STAT. §20-279.21(f)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1957); N.D. REv. CODE §39-
1420(6)(a) (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4509.53(A) (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47 §521(f)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1950); ORE. REV. STAT. §486.551 (Cum.Supp. 1957);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 §1277.21(f)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1953); R.I. GEN. LASv §31-32-
38(1) (1956); S.C. CODE §46-750.26(1) (Cum.Supp. 1958); S.D. STAT. c. 212 §50(6a)
(1957); Tax. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h §21(f) (1) (Cum.Supp. 1958); UTAH CODE ANN,
§41-12-21(f) (1) (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §46.1-511(a) (Cum.Supp. 1958); WASH. REV.
CODE §46.24.120(2) (a) (Cum.Supp. 1957); W.VA. CODE ANN. §1721(521) (f) (1)
(1955); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §60-1521(f)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1957).
11. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 92A §608 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
12. IDA. CODE §49-1521(f)(1) (1947).
13. Wis. STAT. §85.09(21)(f)(1) (1955).
14. MASS. LAWs ANN. c. 175 §113A(5) (1946).
15. MASS. LAWS ANN. C. 90 §3G, §22A (1946).
16. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw §93-93-k (Cum.Supp. 1958).
17. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw §94-94-nn, 94-q(i)(1) (1952).
THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION
000 one issued under a state act whose statutory limits were $5,000/10,000?
Was the entire policy "absolute" or only up to the statutory amounts? Suppose
the printed provisions of the policy made it subject to the financial responsibility
laws of the state but actually the policy was not a "required" one in that the in-
sured had never been involved in an accident? Suppose a previous accident was
involved but the insured never advised his insurer, taking out the policy under
an assumed name? Rather generally the case interpretations of these statutes laid
,down a pattern of partial absoluteness. Absolute, yes, but only up to the statutory
amounts;' when the policy had been required' and issued by the insurer with
knowledge that it was a required policy.20
There were problems other than of termination under financial responsibility
laws. It was the insured and not the car that was covered. Even where a required
policy was involved, the liability insured against was for claims caused by the
car while being driven with the "consent or permission" of the owner. "Absolute"
policies had no application to the stolen car as it was obviously driven without
the "consent or permission" of the owner. Unregistered automobiles were un-
protected. At first the out-of-state driver created a large exception to coverage.
Gradually, however, states with financial responsibility laws began to adopt re-
ciprocity legislation. Most states now, as a matter of comity, interchange pro-
tection. Hazards still exist as to the hit-and-run driver, the uninsured motorist
having his first accident. In 1954 New York State required all applicants for
1955 vehicle registration to state whether or not they were covered by liability
insurance. The results of this survey indicated that 14 per cent of the vehicles
registered by the end of that year were not covered by insurance-more than one
half million motor vehicles.2 ' No figures are available to indicate how many al-
legedly insured owners, not having "required" policies, have their policies ter-
minated after loss because of breaches of conditions set forth in the policies.
Thus had financial responsibility legislation progressed over a 30 year period
from that January 1, 1926, in Connecticut. This was one financial solution being
widely offered to a sociological phenomenon that each year was destroying in
equivalence, every man, woman and child in a city the size of Watertown, New
York, or Brownsville, Texas, or Bakersfield, California.22
18. Farm Bur. Auto Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 84 A.2d 823 (1951).
19. Cohen v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 223 App. Div. 340, 252 N.Y.S. 841 (4th Dept.
1931) (Not a required policy although financial responsibility clause printed in
policy.); Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Breen, 2 App. Div.2d 271, 153 N.Y.S. 2d
732 (3d Dept. 1956) (Absolute provisions apply only to those required by Mass.
statute). Accord, Sutton v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 138 F.2d 781 (6 Cir. 1943); Farm
Bur. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4 Cir. 1949); Hoosier Cas. Co.
of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Fox, 102 F.Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952); New Zealand Ins.
Co. v. Holloway, 1223 F.Supp. 642 (W.D. La. 1954).
20. Buzzone v. Hartford Acc. & Ins. Co., 23 N.J. 447, 129 A.2d 561 (1957).
21. N.Y. State Leg. Doe. (1956) No. 8. Message of the Governor.
22. U.S. Census figures.
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The Massachusetts Plan of Compulsory Insurance and Its Progeny
On January 1, 1927, Massachusetts had adopted another approach-that of
compulsory insurance for her residents.23 Municipally and state owned vehicles
were excluded from the insurance requirements; "gueste victims were not covered.2 4
Such limitations are common under financial responsibility legislation. To avoid
the cancellation and rescission problems, the Massachusetts act provides:
(5) That no statement made ;y the insured or on his behalf, either
in securing the policy or in securing registration of the motor vehicle
or trailer covered, thereby; no violation of the term of the po!icy and
no act or default of the insured, either prior or subsequent to the issue
of the policy, shall operate to defeat or avoid the policy so as to bar
recovery within the limit provided in the policy by a judgment creditor
proceeding under the provisions of said section one hundred and
thirteen and clause (10) of section three of chapter two hundred and
fourteen.25
These "absolute after-loss" provisions, like those in the financial responsi-
bility acts, apply only to the "required" policies provisions and only up to the
statutory amounts.26 The part that really stirred things up involved the setting
of insurance rates by the state. For the past thirty years charges and counter-
charges have been hurled over the efficacy of the Massachusetts compulsory in-
surance program in solving the financial problems of the traffic victim vis-a-vis
the private enterprise system. It is alleged that compulsory insurance makes
operators accident prone. If this were sound the entire concept of insurance
against loss is a dangerous fallacy. As a matter of fact, Massachusetts enjoys one
of the lowest fatal accident rates in the country27 A more substantial charge is
that private insurance companies cannot operate there on a financially sound
basis because of the low premium charges set by the state.28 There apparently is
merit to this charge as far as the stock companies are concerned. While they
appear to lose money on the "required" policy business, on their over-all automo-
bile business they enjoy a profit. Mutual companies with their lower operating
costs can operate profitably even on the required policies. The original theory
of the rating was to set it at a level profitable to stock companies. Great court
congestion is blamed on the act. Great congestion equally exists in states with-
23. See note 6, supra.
24. See, Should Motor Vehicle Insurance for Cars Owned by Municipalities
and charitable Organizations be Provided for, and if so, How? 25 Mass. L.Q.
No. 6, p. 11 (1940).
25. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 175, §113A(5) (1946).
26. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Breen, supra note 19.
27. Accident Facts, 1958. Death rate, 1957, for United States was 5.9 per
100 million vehicle miles. The rate for Massachusetts was 3.3 or 519 deaths. Only
nine states were below 5. For comparison, New York had a 5.0 rate or 2,191
deaths.
28. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50
CoL UM. L. REv. 300, 312-317 (1950).
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out compulsory insurance. Massachusetts has taken several procedural steps to
relieve this congestion by encouraging the non-jury trials of automobile cases. 2s'
In 1930, encouraged by the Massachusetts experiment, England embarked
on a compulsory insurance program which has been in effect ever since30 Like
the Massachusetts Act it covers only death and personal injuries--no property
damage.3 1 Proof of insurance must be presented for registration of the vehicle.32
Unlike Massachusetts, no limitations on amount are set forth. Rate setting is left
up to the insurance companies. Even though these are required policies, the in-
surance company, after loss, may bring an action seeking a declaratory judgment
cancelling the policy on a showing that the policy was obtained by the non-dis-
closure of a material fact or by a representation false in some material particular,
and here the test of the "ordinarily prudent insurer" will be applied3m Breaches
of conditions subsequent to the formation of the contract are not available for
avoiding liability after loss.3 4 All automobile cases are tried by the court with-
out a jury as are most tort cases in England.3 5 The paucity of condemnatory
literature in England on the subject of compulsory insurance would seem to in-
dicate a successful experiment.38 Various forms of compulsory automobile liability
insurance are in force in several European countries 7
The Columbia Report-A Compensation Plan-And Its Progeny
These two social experiments in compensating the traffic victim-financial
responsibility acts and compulsory insurance legislation-were hardy well started
when the national depression of the thirties posed new problems. Millions of un-
employed meant a sizable increase in insolvent defendants. A committee, chaired
by Arthur A. Ballantine, was formed at Columbia University for the purpose of
studying compensation payments to traffic victims.38 As described in the Com-
mittee's report, its research "included the investigation of 8,849 cases of personal
injury and death caused by motor vehicle accidents, the assembling of data fur-
nished by public officials and by insurance companies, the examination of statutes
29. Id. at 315.
30. The Road Traffic Acts of 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43; Part II (Provisions
against third-party risks) amended, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 50.
31. The Road Traffic Acts, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43 §36.
32. The Road Traffic Acts, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43 §39.
33. The Road Traffic Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 50 §10.
34. Bright v. Ashfold, [1932] 2 K.Bfl 153.
35. The Administration of Justice (Appeals) Act, 1934, 23 & 24 Geo. 5
c. 36 §6.
36. See Deak, Compulsory Liability Insurance Under the British Road
Traffic Acts of 1930 and 1984, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 565 (1936).
37. Smith. Y.B.. Co ation for Automobile Accidents, 32 COLUM. L. Rnv.
785. 796 X1932).
38. The Committee was actually first organized in 1928 under the auspices
of the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences. A
research grant was obtained from the Rockefeller Foundation. A staff was set
up under the direction of Shippen Lewis, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
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and judicial decisions and the analyses of pamphlets and articles dealing with the
problem. Particular attention has been given to the operation of the financial
responsibility laws and of the Massachusetts compulsory liability insurance law,
Ind to the probable effects of a system of compensation insurance analogous to
workmen's compensation."
39
The report of the Columbia Committee was published February 1, 1932. It
analyzed the traffic problem in terms of fault vs. non-fault liabiiity. The ap-
proved solution was a scheduled compensation plan based exclusively on damage
rather than fault liability. The conclusions of the Committee follow:
The Committee in its report has tried to present the facts w'thout
bias so that the careful reader can draw his own conclusions as to the
relative advantages and disadvantages of existing systems and of the
suggested plan of compensation. The Committee believes, however,
that the reader is also entitled to a statement of its own principal con-
clusions from the facts presented. The conclusions of the Committee
are therefore stated briefly as follows:
The generally prevailing system of providing damages for motor
vehicle accidents is inadequate to meet existing conditions. It is based
on the principle of liability for fault which is difficult to apply and
often socially undesirable in its application; its administration through
the courts is costly and slow, and it makes no provision to ensure the
financial responsibility of those who are found to be liable.
The data obtained from the case studies indicate that uninsured
owners of motor vehicles as a class pay for only a very small propor-
tion of the damage which their motor vehicles cause. Financial responsi-
bility laws do little to correct this injustice. The compulsory insurance
liability insurance law has largely eliminated the evil of financial
irresponsibility in Massachusetts and is the most advanced step taken
in this country to solve the compensation problem. The Committee
strongly approves of requiring every owner of a motor vehicle to in-
sure against whatever legal liability may be imposed upon him for per-
sonal injuries or death caused by its operation.
The Committee believes, however, that the remedy must go
further than the compulsory liability insurance law, and that no system
based on liability for fault is adequate to meet existing conditions.
The Committee favors the plan of compensation with limited liability
and without regard to fault, analogous to that of the workmen's com-
pensation laws. Such a plan would eliminate the use of the principle
of negligence, would place the burden of economic loss on the owner
or operator to whose activity the loss is chiefly due, would provide for
an equitable distribution of the insurance fund according to the extent
39. Automobile Accidents, Report of Committee to Study Compensation(1932) at p. 2.
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of the economic loss, and would provide a prompt remedy at small cost
to the injured person or his family. The operation of such a plan would
be of special benefit in the majority of cases of serious injury or of
death. The Committee believes that such a compensation plan would
be workable, that its cost to motor vehicle owners need not be unreason-
able and that it would not violate the due process clause of the federal
constitution.40
This report did not generate wide popular support either with the insurance
companies or with legislators. The crisis with which it was concerned began to
improve with the national economic recovery.
In 1947, the Canadian Province of Saskatchewan adopted an automobile
accident insurance act which combined the features of a scheduled compensation
plan based on absolute liability with a full damage recovery based on fault.41
The act is buttressed on compulsory insurance (except for governmental vehicles
in other than the Province of Saskatchewan) 42 the basic rates for which are
governmentally regulated.43 Insurers are given the opportunity to set extra
charges for hazardous risks with provision for appeals to the Rate Appeal Board.44.
Three different types of coverage are required: (1) Motor vehicle accident insur-
ance which is based on damage rather than fault and provides death and personal
injury benefits on a scheduled basis similar to workmen's compensation acts and
similar to that recommended by the Columbia Committee; 45 (2) comprehensive
insurance which covers loss or damage to the automobile itself on a contract
rather than fault basis subject to certain statutory exceptions and less certain
deductible amounts set forth in applicable regulations;46 and (3) public liability
and property damage insurance, based on fault liability of the owner or one oper-
ating with his consent, in the amounts not to exceed $10,000 for bodily injury
to or the death of one person in one accident and $20,000 for bodily injury to or
the death of two or more persons in one accident and $2,000 property damage.47
Any payments made under either the non-fault accident insurance or the compre-
hensive insurance will be deducted from the amount of the fault judgment
obtained unless the negligent operator was intoxicated, unqualified to drive, etc.4
Excluded from fault liability coverage are injuries covered by workmen's compen-
sation, injuries to certain dose members of the family, injuries received while
entering or alighting from the vehicle and while repairing, selling, servicing,
starting or parking such vehicle.49 The policy includes the usual duty to defend
40. Id. at 216-217.
41. SASKATCHEWAN REV. STAT. c. 371 §§1-69 (1953).
42. SAS. REV. STAT. §3(2) (1953).
43. SAs. REV. STAT. §5 (1953).
44. SAS. REV. STAT. §§6-9 (1953).
45. SAs. REV. STAT. §§17-30 (1953).
46. SAS. REV. STAT. §§31-34 (1953).
47. SAs. REV. STAT. §§35-43 (1953).
48. SAs. REV. STAT. §62 (1953).
49. SAS. REV. STAT. §37 (1953).
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and right to settle. ° If fault is established, the policy becomes "absolute" after
loss except that no claim on behalf of the insured or through him is honored in
the event of a false representation or false fact to the prejudice of the insurer.
51
Farsighted provisions are made for the troublesome problem of plural plaintiffs in
the multiple-car collision. The act provides:
5 2
(1) Where several actions are brought for the recovery of bene-
fits or insurance money payable under this act in respect of a single
accident, the court may consolidate or otherwise deal therewith in order
that there shall be but one action for and in respect of all the claims
made in such actions.
(2) In all actions where several persons are entitled to benefits
or insurance money payable under the provisions of this act, the court
may apportion among the persons entitled thereto any sum directed to
be paid, and may give all necessary direction and relief.
This, then, is the outline of the combination answer Saskatchewan offers to
the financial problem of the automobile victim. Its prophylactic virtues appear
negative when compared with New York and Massachusetts on the death rate
per 100,000 population based on 1956 figures: Mass.-9.4; N.Y.-14.6; Sask.
-17.5 .53
The New York Development
New York in 1929 joined the group of states adopting the Connecticut
solution of Safety-Financial Responsibility Acts of the kind requiring insurance
as security after an unsatisfied judgment for death or personal injuries (property
damages in excess of $100).P4 This later was broadened to include certain
accidents 5 The publication of the Columbia Committee's Report in 1932 and
its recommended non-fault compensation solution was very disturbing to the
advocates of financial responsibility legislation. A joint committee of the New
York State Legislature was created in 1935 to investigate automobile insurance and
safety. This committee carried over into 1936. In 1937 a successor committee
was created under the title of Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Auto-
mobile Insurance. The first major report of'this committee appeared in 1938
as Legislative Document No. 91. It was based on a study of 3,000 accidents
occurring in New York State in the two years 1933 and 1934. Without making
any recommendations at that time, the legislative committee set forth three
alternative plans for handling the financial problems involved. One plan entailed
50. SAs. REv. STAT. §38 (1953).
51. SAs. REv. STAT. §61(1) (1953).
52. SAS. REv. STAT. §47 (1953).
53. Accidents Facts, 1958.
54. L. 1929 c. 695, §1.
55. L. 1941 c. 872, §94-e.
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a system of compulsory insurance, coverage to be supplied either by private
insurance companies or by a combination of private companies and a State
Insurance Fund. A second alternative was a compulsory compensation plan
along the lines of the New York State Workmen's Compensation Law. A third
alternative involved amendments to the then Safety-Responsibility Law in order
to immediately assure small payments ($300 maximum) to the victim of the
"first" accident. This was to be accomplished by the establishment of a state
bureau to guarantee limited compensation on a non-fault basis covering hospital,
medical and surgical expenses only, plus funeral benefits ($300 maximum) in
case of death. This plan was aimed directly at the uninsured owner. It was to
be financed by him by an additional registration fee of $5 per year.
This Joint Legislative Committee, in 1939,56 reported that, in spite of the
persuasive arguments of men like Arthur Ballantine, Jr., it was unable to recom-
mend either the compulsory insurance or the compensation plan set forth as
alternatives in 1938. It did recommend the third alternative requiring a modifi-
cation of the Safety-Responsibility Act granting limited compensation protection
for the "first" accident, with the injured party retaining his common-law cause of
action, payments from the State fund being deducted from any judgment The
report and recommendation of the Joint Legislative Committee proved instructive
only. The recommendation failed to become law. It wasn't until 1950 that legis-
lative interest revived. In that year a Joint Legislative Committee on an Unsatis-
fied Judgment Fund was created and extended in 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955
and 1956. The report of this committee in 1956 recommended a Motor Vehicle
Financial Security Act, i.e. compulsory insurance.57
Surveys demonstrated to the satisfaction of some, that 13 or 14 per cent of
the automobiles registered in New York State were without insurance.58 Many
insurance companies offered, for a very small cost, a rider granting some protection
against the uninsured driver. However, one needed an automobile policy to
take advantage of the offer. The move toward compulsory insurance was not to
be resisted. Governor Thomas Dewey publicly advocated the measure. In 1956
the Compulsory Insurance Act was passed, going into effect February 1, 1957. 51
Thirty years after Massachusetts had required, as a condition precedent to motor
vehicle registration, a liability insurance policy, compulsory insurance gained its
second supporter.
The insurance coverage selected was 10,000/20,000 for death or personal
56. N.Y.State Leg. Doc. (1939) No. 63.
7b. hL-Y-S-tate-ezP&c-(1956) No. 51.
58. See-note 21, 8upra.
59. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAmc LAwv §§93-93-k (Cum.Supp. 1958).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
injuries. Unlike Massachusetts, a $5,000 property coverage was compelled. Like
the British Road Act, the state left to the insurance companies the rate-setting
procedure. The victim of the non-resident motorist, the hit-and-run driver, the
stolen vehicle, the "driven without consent" car, the unregistered vehicle was
without the financial protection of the Act. The insurance companies succeeded
in bringing about what appears to be a rather startling change in the status of
their liability "after loss" under these new compulsory policies. Under the old
Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law which is continued as Article 6-B of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law, liability of the insurance company on a required policy
became "absolute" after loss.60 Violation of conditions either precedent or subse-
quent were unavailable to the insurer once loss had occurred.0' The new compul-
sory insurance law, present Article 6-A of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, in §93-a
(4) (a) thereof, continues this provision for policies required under the Safety-
Responsibility Law. However, as pointed out earlier, the usefulness of this
continuation is dubious when §94-r abolishes the requirement for filing proof of
financial responsibility. As far as the new compulsory policies are concerned, the
Superintendent of Insurance is forbidden by statute to promulgate any minimum
standard provisions "which fail to reflect the provisions of automobile liability
insurance policies, other than motor vehicle liability policies as defined in section
ninety-four-q of this chapter, issued within this state at the date of such regulation
or amendment thereof."0 2  The position of the carriers is that except for 94-q
policies (those required under the Safety-Responsibility Act), no "absolute-after-
loss" policies were being written in the state and. that therefore the Superintendent
of Insurance cannot make the new "compulsory" policies "absolute-after-loss."
How accurate this statutory interpretation is remains to be seen. The first
authoritative interpretation of the statute appears in the opinion of Judge
McDonald sitting in Special Term, Kings County, New York, May, 1958.03
There the insurance company sought a declaratory judgment that it was not
liable on a compulsory automobile policy after loss because of the failure of
insured to comply with the policy provision for giving notice of the accident.
The substance of the insured's position was that the policy, issued under the new
Compulsory Insurance Law, became "absolute" after loss. The substance of the
insurer's position was that the new Compulsory Insurance Law does not require
an "absolute" policy. Judge McDonald held 'that the policy, as issued under the
new Compulsory Insurance Law, was not an "absolute" policy. His obiter in
interpreting §93-a(4) (a) will give little comfort to the insurance companies
whose position has been that the Superintendent of Insurance has no statutory
authority to make these compulsory policies "absolute." Judge McDonald, after
paraphrasing §93-a(4) (a) states:
60. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw §94-q(i)1 (Cum.Supp. 1952).
61. Cohen v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., note 19, supra.
62. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §93-a(4) (a) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
63. Gen. Ace. Fire & Life Ass. Corp. v. Martino, - Misc.2d- , 175 N.Y.S.2d
894 (1958).
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By the foregoing the Legislature left it to the Superintendent of Insurance
to determine the requirements of the policies to be issued but provided
they should not be less than the standard policies then in force and while
they did not exclude the possibility that the Superintendent might include
provisions making the policies absolute they did not require him to do so.
The legislature neither imposed the requirement that the liability policies
issued pursuant to the statute be absolute nor did it repeal the statutory
recognition of such defense which previously existed.64  [Emphasis
supplied.]
No sooner had the compulsory insurance legislation been approved than
plans were being urged to supplement it. Governor Averell Harriman in his
annual message to the legislature of January 9, 1957 urged corrective legislation
in the nature of an Indemnity Fund.65 In a special message in the same year 66
he called the legislators' attention to bills already in the legislative hopper which
set forth alternate plans to round out the compulsory insurance program. The
Joint Legislative Committee to Study the Problem of the Unsatisfied Judgment
Fund and Compulsory Insurance in 1957 recommended no change in the existing
legislation until more time had elapsed.67  Again in 1958 Governor Averell
Harriman in a special message to the legislature urged action on some sort of an
unsatisfied judgment fund.68 All this political activity resulted in the present
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation which went into effect
January 1, 1959.69
64.. Id. at 900. Whether §63 of the N.Y. INSURANCE LAW, "Assigned risk
plans," added originally by L. 1946 c. 467 and as amended by L. 1958, §1, eff. Ap.
11, 1958, permits rescission after loss was recently decided in the negative by
Judge Hill sitting in Special Term, Supreme Court, Suffolk County in Aetni
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. O'Connor -Misc.2d- , 178 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1958).
65. N.Y. State Leg. Doc. (1957) No. 1.
In 1947 North Dakota adopted an Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, NJ). REV. CODE
§§39-1701-39-1710 (1957 Supp.), Lo be raised by a one dollar fee on each automobile
in addition to the registration fee. In 1952 New Jersey adopted a similar but more
thoroughly developed Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, N.J.S.A. tit. 39
§§6-61-6-91 (Cum.Supp. 1958). The pattern of the New Jersey legislation was
adopted by Maryland in 1957. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law,
MD. CODE ANN. art. 66 % §§150-179 (1957). These Acts all bear some similarity
to the N.Y. MVAIC Law. However, they do not involve compulsory insurance
The N.J. and Md. funds are created by annual assessments of varying amounts on
the uninsured, the insured motorist and the insurance companies doing business
in the respective states. Unlike the N.Y. MVAIC. the N.J. and Md. Fund Boards
are not all-insurance boards. Their membership includes both the Motor Vehicle
Commissioner and the Supt. of Insurance as public representatives. Again, unlike
N.Y. where the MVAIC does all the investigating and handling of claims, in N.J.
and Md. the Fund Boards assign the investigation and handling of claims to the
various insurers. The limit of payments under the N.D. Act is $5,000/$10,000-
no property. The limit for N.J. and Md. is $10,000/$20,000/$5,000.
66. N.Y. State Leg. Doc. (1957) No. 40k.
67. N.Y. State Leg. Doc. (1957) No. 36.
68. N.Y. State Leg. Doc. (1958) No. 6 at p. 17.
69. See note 2, supra.
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The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation Act
As pointed out, compulsory insurance has provided protection for a much
larger group of injured than the financial responsibility law. However, it did not
provide protection for all traffic victims. There were still the uninsured non-
resident drivers, the hit-and-run drivers, those driving stolen vehicles, unregistered
vehicles, registered vehicles which were somehow not insured, vehicles operated
without the consent of the owners and those owners and operators of insured
vehicles whereon the insurer disclaims liability or denies coveraje after loss.
It was to protect against these tort-feasors that the Motor Vehi'le Accident
Indemnification Corporation law, hereafter referred to as MVAIC, was designed.
This law makes no change in the fundamental concepts of fault liability. The
traffic victim can recover only upon a showing of fault. The effect of the law
is to say, if the injured party establishes fault against certain defendants from
whom he is unable to collect a judgment in the amouni of $10,000 on account of
injury to or death of one person, or $20,000 on account of the injury to or death
of more than one person in any one accident, then the traffic victim can turn to
the Corporation for payment.
This Corporation is made up of all the insurers "authorized on or after the
effective date of this article [January 1, 1959] in this state to write liability
insurance in connection with motor vehicles * * * ,,70 It is managed by a board
of directors of six men which directors are required to be insurance men.71 The
Corporation is declared to be a nonprofit one and is exempt from all but local
taxes.72 At various times and in differing situations it is charged with the complex
responsibility of looking after the interests of the insurance companies, 73 the
defendant tort-feasors74 and the injured plaintiffs."P
To understand just how this Corporation works it is necessary to divide the
potential traffic victims into three groups. These groups are: (1) insureds,
(2) qualified persons, and (3) those excluded from either category. The insureds
are those New York residents who either own an insured motor vehicle, or who
in some way qualify as an insured under the" omnibus clause in policies written
on or after January 1, 1959, as authorized by section 167 of the New York State
70. N.Y. INsuRANcE LAw §602 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
71 N.Y. INSURANcE LAW §603 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
The directors initially appointed are: William J. Ahearn, exec. vice-pres. Great
Amer. Indem. Co.; Joseph F. Murphy, see. and counsel Amer. Fore Insur. Gp.;
William F. Dowling, pres. N.Y. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co; Roy C. McCullough, gen. counsel
Lum. Mut. Cas. Co.; Henry S. Moser, senior vice-pres. Allstate Ins. Co.; Herman
W. Reeder, exec. vice-pres. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
72. N.Y. INSURANcE LAW §§602, 625 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
73. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §605 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
74. N.Y. INSURANcE LAW §§606(e), 609 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
75. N.Y. INSURANcE LAW §§606(b)(c), 608 (Cum.Supp. 1958.).
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Insurance Law.7 6 A "qualified person" is one who is a resident of the State of
New York who does not own an insured automobile or who at the time of the
accident does not qualify as an insured under the omnibus clause required by
section 167 of the Insurance Law, or whose policy was written before January 1,
1959.77 If on such pre-1959 policies the insured has included the rider offered
by some insurance companies for protection against the uninsured automobile, then
such an assured is neither an "insured" nor a "qualified person" under the new
legislation and will seek his recourse from his insurance company based on this
contractual rider.78  The excluded group presently covers non-residents, although
the act provides for reciprocity with those states having similar legislation.79
At this writing North Dakota, New Jersey, and Maryland have legislation
which New York may say is "of substantially similar character."80 Also excluded
from either the classification "insured" or "qualified person" is the car owner in
New York who does not have that car insured.81  In addition to leaving him
outside of the protection of this law, his or her spouse is given no protection
if the spouse is injured while a passenger in such uninsured vehicle.82 As a
matter of practical politics it can be understood, although perhaps not justified
why an Iowan hurt in. New York can be left to his useless remedy against
an insolvent tort-feasor, or why a New Yorker driving and hit in Erie, Pennsyl-
vania, by a car stolen from Buffalo is without the umbrella of this act. But how
can the broad exclusion of the uninsured owner, and under certain circumstances
his spouse, be justified? Of course the theory of this is to force insured registration
and that is in accord with the Compulsory Insurance Law. But consider the
following situation. On January 30th of any particular year hereafter Mr. Jones
owns two automobiles each one of which is covered by an insurance policy and.
each one of which has been properly registered in New York. On that day
Mr. Jones decides to register, for the ensuing year only, one of those automobilet
and to put the other one up on blocks in his garage. He goes through the proper
procedure for cancellirig the insurance on that unused automobile. Mr. Jones
will still fit under the category of "insured" because of his policy on the other
car and is still within the protection of the Corporation. Mr. Smith, however, a
less affluent man, had only one car on January 30th. Perhaps, because of eco-
nomic necessity, he could no longer afford to operate that car. He, therefore,
76. N.Y. INSURANCE LAw §601(i) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
77. N.Y. INSURANCE LAw §601(b) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
78. The liability endorsement required by N.Y. INSUANCE LAw §167 (2-a)(Cum.Supp. 1958) provides: "4. Limits of Liability ... (b) Any amounts payable
under the terms of this endorsement including amounts payable for care or
loss of services, because of bodily injuries sustained by one person, shall be
reduced by . . . (2) all sums paid to one or more insureds on account of such
bodily injury under any insurance similar to that provided by this endorse-
ment .... "'
79. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §601(b) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
80. See note 65, supra.
81. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §601(b) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
82. Ibid.
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decides not to register that car for the coming year and properly cancels his insur-
ance. Having no liability policy, Mr. Smith cannot qualify under the insured
group and now as the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle, he cannot be classed
as a "qualified person." If, thereafter, he is injured by an uninsured defendant,
the wording of the statute would seem to exclude him from protection. Can
much of a defense similarly be made for the exclusion of his spouse, no matter
how innocent she may be, if she is hurt while a passenger in her husband's
uninsured motor vehicle? This certainly is "guilt by association."
Excluded also from coverage is the element of damage to property. Only
personal injury and death claims are protected5 3
With the membership of the Corporation in mind and the three classifications
of traffic victims before us, consider the procedures by which the traffic victim
ultimately presents to the Corporation his claim for payment. Let's examine a
traffic accident slightly more complicated perhaps than the average accident but
one in which the various procedures may be analyzed. The accident is a multiple-
car collision on U.S. Route 20, a major east-west highway. Car No. 1 is proceeding
west on Route 20. It is properly registered in New Yogk and insured for the
statutory minimum. It is being driven at the time by the owner, Mr. A. Riding
with him is an unrelated infant guest, B, and an adult passenger, C, who resides in
Pennsylvania. Car No. 2 is also proceeding iri a westerly direction, immediately
ahead of car No. 1. It is being operated by D, the 22 year old son of the insured
owner, E, who is not present in the car but who had given his son permission to
drive the car. While approaching a curve to the right, the driver of car No. 1
attempted to overtake and pass car No. 2. At that time car No. 3, proceeding in
an easterly direction, was approaching head-on at an illegal rate of speed. There
was adequate room for all three cars to pass abreast. Car No. 3 was a stolen
automobile being operated by a thief, F. Seeing car No. 3 approach, the driver of
car No. 2 panicked as car No. 1 was passing. Car No. 2 swerved out of line and
bumped passing car No. 1, which in turn swerved over into the lane occupied by
approaching car No. 3. To avoid the collision, car No. 3 swerved, missed hitting
both cars No. 1 and 2 but did sideswipe a pedestrian, G, standing on the shoulder
of the road, seriously injuring him. Cars No. 1 and 2 came to a Stop. Car No. 3
left the scene of the accident and has never been identified. All occupants in cars
No. 1 and 2 were injured. In the haste to take care of the injured parties the
matter of officially reporting the accident was not taken care of until two days
later. This situation presents us with "insureds," "qualified persons" and "excluded
83. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §608 (Cum.Supp. 1958). The New Jersey and Mary-
land legislation covers property damage. The N. Dakota leg. does not. See note
65, supra.
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persons." In car No. 1, Mr. A is an insured, infant B is a "qualified person' and
nonresident C is an "excluded person."
814
At the time of the accident it is not apparent, of course, to the injured
parties whether or not any financially irresponsible motorist is involved, that is,
an uninsured motorist. It so happens that Mr. E, the absentee owner of car No. 2,
has intentionally made a material misrepresentation'to his insurance carrier when
applying for his present policy.8 5
Absent this new legislation, the matter is relatively simple. The hit-and-run
driver is gone and never found. Those damages properly chargeable to the
negligence of the owner and operator of car No. 1 and car No. 2 can be
processed at any time hereafter by any of the non-negligent plaintiffs within the
usual statute of limitations and subject to the usual cross-claim procedure. In the
event of judgments against the owner of car No. 1, they will be satisfied out of
his insurance policy up to its applicable limits. The insurance on car No. 2 will
not be available. This is because of the action for rescission thereafter successfully
brought by the insurance carrier on car No. 2 based upon the material intentional
false representation. What changes does the new legislation make in this
situation?
let us first consider the claim of the injured pedestrian. Without the
Indemnification Corporation, having no hit-and-run defendant to identify and
serve with the summons, his recourse, if any, would lie against the owners and
operators of cars No. 1 and 2. The new legislation sets forth a hit-and-run
procedure. The accident is to be reported within 24 hours or as soon thereafter
as reasonably possible.88 Within 90 days of the accrual of the cause of action a
notice of intention to file a claim against the Corporation must be filed 7
alleging that the injured person is filing a claim either as a "qualified person" or
'insured"; that he has a cause of action arising out of such accident for damages
and setting forth the facts in support thereof; that such cause of action lies against
a person whose identity is unascertainable; and that he intends to make a claim
thereon for such damages. Thereafter, if proceeding as a "qualified person," he
may bring a proceeding in the supreme court, upon notice to the Corporation,
for permission to bring an action against the Corporation. If proceeding as an
"insured," after giving notice of the claim, he can try to work out an agreement
with the Corporation both as to the liability and as to the amount of damages.
84 The practitioner will need to make a last minute check for his non-
resident clients whose state legislature may have just adopted legislation of
"substantially similar character to that provided for by this article .... "
85. Under N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §149 (1949) this would permit the carrier
to rescind.
86. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §608(b) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
87 N.Y. INSURANCE LAw § §608, 618 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
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If agreement is not reached, then, pursuant to the new endorsement that will go
on all section 167 policies after January 1, 1959, the dispute must be submitted
to arbitration.
Let me assume that in our situation the injured pedestrian owns no auto-
mobile and is a New York resident. He is, therefore, a "qualified person."
He or someone in his behalf must report the accident as soon as reasonably
possible and file the notice of claim referred to above with the MVAIC. The
Corporation is given authority to settle claims under $2,0003 without the
approval of the court either before or after action is commenc d against the
Corporation. Approval of settlements exceeding that amount must be obtained
from the supreme court. Assuming that this pedestrian's action is not settled and
it hardly would be because of the potential liability as to cars 1 and 2, the
pedestrian, with the approval of the supreme court, may commence an action
against the Corporation. He may also want to bring an action against the owners
and operators of cars No. 1 and 2. Can all of these actions be joined in one?
The new legislation appears to continue the New York practice of permitting the
plaintiff to select his defendants and authorizes the plaintiff to make the Corpo-
ration a party. Hence, apparently, in our situation the plaintiff could name as
defendants the owners and operators of cars 1 and 2 plus the Corporation in one
action. If he brings a separate action against the Corporation alone, can the
Corporation on its own motion bring in additional defendants? Unless the courts
are prepared to consider this as an indemnity rather than a contribution situation,
CPA §211-a would appear to deny to the Corporation this privilege8 9 If he gets
a separate judgment against the Corporation based upon the liability of the
hit-and-run driver, the act provides that the Corporation may apply in reduction
amounts received from other sources, this being treated as excess rather than
prorata insurance.9° Thus, if the pedestrian received in settlement or by way of
collectible judgment $10,000 from cars 1 and/or 2, he would recover nothing in
addition from the Corporation. On the other hand, if he had not proceeded
against cars 1 and 2 but had recovered $10,000 from the Corporation, the Corpo-
ration would be subrogated to his claim against the hit-and-run operator and/or
owner.9 ' Assignment of personal injury claims to the Corporation are specifically
authorized in spite of the prohibition of §41 of the Personal Property Law.9 2
At this point, one provision of the act concerning hit-and-run cases should
be noted. This appears to be a very inadequate section and seems to need
immediate legislative correction. This is section 617 of the Insurance Law. It
88. N.Y. INSURANCE LAw §613 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
89. See Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289
(1931).
90. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §§610, 619 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
91. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §619(b) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
92. N.Y. INSURANCE LAw §613(4) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
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offers protection to the insured or qualified person only if, (1) the injured
person was physically struck by the hit-and-run car itself or, (2) the automobile
in which the injured person was riding was struck by the hit-and-run car. In our
situation this would mean that no one in cars I and 2 would have a hit-and-run
claim against the Corporation because the hit-and-run car did not make physical
contact either with them or with their motor vehicle. Assume, for instance, that
to avoid a hit-and-run car the pedestrian had attempted to escape and had been
struck by a non-negligent automobile driver who would not, by definition, be
liable. The pedestrian could not recover because there was no physical contact
with the hit-and-run car.93
Examine now the collision problems facing A (owner and operator of car
No. 1), B (infant guest) and C (non-resident guest riding in car No. 1) all of
whom were injured. Non-resident C is without the protection of the act. He
will have his usual common-law remedies, as amplified by sections 59 of the N.Y.
Vehicle and Traffic Law and §167(1)b of the N.Y. Insurance Law, against the
owner and operator of car No. 1, Mr. A and Mr. A's insurance company, and
the operator D and owner E of car No. 2 but not against car No. 2's insurance
carrier if it has succeeded in rescinding.
Infant B, and his parents, of course, will have the same common law claims
as amplified by sections 59 of the N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law and §167(1)b
of the N.Y. Insurance Law, as does non-resident C. In addition B will have certain
claims against the Corporation. He will have no claim against the Corporation for
the hit-and-run driver as there was no physical contact. As his driver, Mr. A, is an
insured driver there is no occasion there for protection by the Corporation.
However, infant B will undoubtedly be interested in suing.the owner and operator
of car No. 2, the car that swerved out of line originally and bumped car No. 1.
After the accident infant B learns that car No. 2 appears to be an insured auto-
mobile. This would seem to totally eliminate the Corporation from his consider-
ation. He does not know of the misrepresentation made by the owner of car
No. 2 to the insurance carrier. Presumably, therefore, he and his parents will
sue D and E or A, D, and E and, perhaps, get a judgment for $10,000 running
against all three, A, D, and E. At some point the insurance carrier for E discovers
the material misrepresentation, seeks and obtains a declaratory judgment of no
liability under the policy.9 4 The legislation requires that written notice of this
disclaimer be given by the insurance carrier to the injured person or any other
claimant.95 Within ten days of receiving this notice infant B must notify the
Corporation by filing with it an affidavit including, among other things, notice
of such disclaimer.9 6 Now if his judgment were just against D and E, the
93. N.D., N.J. and Md. have no such requirement. See note 65, supra.
94. I have, of course, assumed no waiver or estoppel.
95. N.Y. INSURANCE LAw §167(1) (e) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
96. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §608(c) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
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owners and operators of car No. 2, then, after successful rescission or cancellation
by their carrier and after having given notice to the Corporation, infant B would
seek supreme court permission to collect said judgment against the Corporation,
less any amount individually collected from D and E. Suppose, however, the
judgment had run against not only D and E but also against A, the insured owner
and operator of car No. 1. What then would the situation be? It would appear
that infant B still should give notice to the Corporation of the disclaimer by the
carrier on car No. 2. Although he will not be able to collect from the carrier on
car No. 2, he may still collect the $10,000 from carrier of car No. 1 and therefore
the Corporation will not have to pay. However, it is always posible that the
carrier on car No. 1 may disclaim or also that the total amount of claims may far
exceed the coverage and unless the notice of disclaimer of car No. 2 is given to
the Corporation, infant plaintiff B will have no recourse against the Corporation
for the negligence of car No. 2. The moral of this seems to be that when in doubt
file an affidavit of intention with the Corporation-and this applies to nearly
every personal injury case.
It is purposeful to refer again to the changes made in the old Safety-Responsi-
bility Laws by the new Compulsory Insurance Law in these "required" policies.
Prior to the Compulsory Insurance Law as pointed out earlier the carrier could
not rescind after loss on a required policy.97 The Compulsory Insurance Law, as
so far interpreted, permits this. 8 Absent the MVAIC law this could impose
serious hardship on an injured party. The Safety-Responsibility Act had placed
this risk of loss on the individual insurance company. The Compulsory Insurance
Law placed this risk on the injured traffic victim. The MVAIC law now spreads
the risk over its entire membership. This would seem to be a superior way of
handling the rescission cases.
In other than rescission cases the prescribed time period for the filing with
the Corporation of written notice of intention to file a claim is 90 days.99 No time
is specified for actually filing a claim, so presumably this will be governed by the
usual statute of limitations. Infants and other persons under disability have a
little longer than either the 10 or the 90 .day period to file their notice of
intention with the Corporation-but not much longer.100  If his notice of
intention is not filed in time the person under disability has two choices. He
may file late with the Corporation with an explanation for the late filing and
hope that the Corporation will, in its own discretion, accept the explanation, or he
may, within 120 days from the beginning of the applicable period for filing,
make notice application to a court of competent jurisdiction for permission to
97. See note 10, supra.
98. See note 63, supra.
99. N.Y. INSURANCE LAw §608 (Cum.Supp. 1958).
100. Ibid.
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file late. Throughout the act these time limits are extremely short and may very
well prove to be completely inadequate.101
The owner and operator of car No. 1, Mr. A, similarly has no hit-and-run
claim against the Corporation because there was no physical contact between
car No. 3 and car No. 1. Like infant B he might not have suspected that he had
a claim against the Corporation for the action of car No. 2 because at the time
it appeared that there was insurance on car No. 2. Therefore, the Corporation
would not seem to be involved. The disclaimer by car No. 2's insurance carrier
will affect Mr. A as it affected infant B. His procedure for collecting from the
Corporation will, however, differ substantially from that of infant B, as a quali-
fied person. Mr. A, as the owner of an insured automobile, will be proceeding
as an insured. Policies sold after January 1, 1959, will include the endorsement
required by section 167 (2-a) of the Insurance Law. The endorsement was pre-
pared under the direction of the Corporation' 02 and, supposedly, is in compli-
ance with Regulation 35-A (superseding Regulation 35) of the Insurance De-
partment of the State of New York establishing minimum provisions for auto-
mobile liability insurance policies. Condition No. 5 of the required endorsement
reads as follows:
5. Arbitration. If any person making claim hereunder and
MVAIC do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because
of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of
payment which may be owing under this endorsement, then, upon
written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person
and MVAIC do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance
with the rules of the American Arbitration Ass6diation, and judgment
upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and MVAIC each agree to
consider itself bound and to be bound by any award made by the arbitra-
tors pursuant to this endorsement.
This provision appears to be less favorable to the insured than that authorized
either by section 167 (2-a) of the N.Y. Insurance Law or by Reg. No. 35-A (4)
of the N.Y. Insurance Department which provides:
Such an "owner's policy of liability insurance" shall be subject'to the
applicable provisions of Section 167, as amended. For the purpose of
complying with the provisions of subsection 2-a of Section 167, no policy
subject to this Regulation shall be issued by any authorized insurer
unless it contains coverage providing for payments to the insured, as
defined in such coverage, by the New York Motor Vehicle Accident
101. The Md. and N.J. legislation similarly povides for 90 day filing or
30 days after a physical disability is removed. See note 65, supra.
102. N.Y. INSURANCE LAw §606(b) (Com.Supp. 1958).
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Indemnification Corporation, pursuant to the provisions of Article 17-A
of the Insurance Law applicable to such payments.-
Compulsory negotiation, then, is the procedure for an insured as contrasted
with the opportunity for litigation in the procedure for a qualified person. Query
the effect of section 1448 of the N.Y. Civil Practice Act which excludes infants
from compulsory arbitration without court approval.
The situation in which Mr. D, the injured driver of car No. 2, finds himself
at the time of the accident is analogous to that of Mr. A, the driver of car No. 1.
Mr. D. assumes he is an insured driver and Mr. A demonstrates that he, too, is an
insured driver. Because there was no contact between car No. 3, the hit-and-run
car, and car No. 2, Mr. D will have no hit-and-run claim against the Corporation.
There would seem to be no need to notify the Corporation. However, Mr. D would
be wise, if he intends to sue Mr. A, to file a notice of intention with the Corpora-
-tion in the possible event that Mr. A's registration or evidence of insurance is
invalid, having only 90 days within which to make a decision.
A new problem is faced by traffic victims in the position of Mr. D. Assume
now that he has been hurt in a way which involves the Corporation as a defendant
from whom he will attempt to collect the statutory amounts either as an insured
or as a qualified person. If, before making such collection, his owner's carrier
disclaims successfully, an immediate change takes place in the status of Mr. D.
In the first instance, he will be making his claim as an insured person under the
omnibus clause of the owner's policy and negotiating directly or through arbitration
with the Corporation as provided by the statutory endorsement on the liability
policy. If there is a successful disclaimer against the absentee owner his procedure
will be that of a qualified person (This, of course, assumes that the disclaimer will
also be valid as to him, an omnibus-clause insured. But query?) who will either
settle with or sue the Corporation. Carry the matter a step further. Had his
mother, the wife of the absentee owner, been riding with him and similarly
injured, her status, prior to disclaimer, would have been that of a qualified person.
However, under a successful disclaimer she would appear to be an excluded
person, as a "spouse when a passenger in such vehicle [uninsured motor
vehidel."1 03
Apparently little consideration has been given in this legislation to the
possibility of disclaimer by the plaintiff's insurance carrier, the supposition being
that disclaimer, if any, naturally will be sought by the defendant's carrier on the
theory that he has the only financial interest involved. Upon analysis, plaintiff's
carrier in many situations may be financially motivated to disclaim. The act
provides that the amount of money paid out by the Corporation and charged by
103. N.Y. INsuRANcF LAw §601(b) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
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assessments back to the members will be a factor in determining rates.10 4 Recall
that this Corporation is a 100 per cent insurance corporation, both as to members
and as to management. Its interest would seem to be more closely allied with
those of the carriers than with those of the public. 10 5 Sales resistance to higher
rates is obvious. The fewer claims paid out by the Corporation, the smaller the
impact on the rates. An insured traffic victim, who is also an assured, with a
claim against the Corporation can, perhaps, have his status changed to an excluded
person upon a successful disclaimer. What a tremendous bargaining weapon this
puts in the hands of the Corporation as they negotiate with such an insured
person. It poses the conflict of interest problem that time and again shows up
when the Corporation in one instance may be charged with representing the
interests of a financially irresponsible motorist, in another instance with the
interests of its insurance company members and in still other instances with the
interests of the innocent traffic victim.
This, then, is the present Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corpora-
tion. In theory, the act plugs the half-dozen or so gaps in the Compulsory
Insurance Law. -It creates an insurance corporation to provide for some insured
or qualified persons who are not otherwise protected by the compulsory law.
It distributes this loss over the broad base of all the liability insurers in the state.
Insofar as this theory is accomplished, the legislation carries out the aims and
policies of its supporters. An analysis of the legislation shows that all the holes
are not yet plugged. Innocent traffic victims hurt through the fault of others
may still be unable to recover. Procedural difficulties of a serious nature may trip
the unwary. Burdensome requirements are imposed upon them. Apparently
unjustifiable distinctions are drawn between insured and qualified persons.
Separate routes for recovery are required. The public official is completely elimi-
nated from the management and control of the Corporation, leaving the
members of the public, in many instances, subject only to the sufferance of an
insurance-orientated corporation.
In the early parts of this article, I have attempted to show how the inade-
quacies of the past handling of the traffic victim brought forth New York's
Compulsory Insurance Law and this new MVAIC. I suggest that this is not the
last step in protecting the traffic victim. The inadequacies in MVAIC will call
for additional remedies. It is possible, now that New York has created a new
instrumentality for dealing with the economic loss caused by the motor vehicle
accident in a way which distributes this loss over a broad base, that the time for
rethinking the problems of the traffic accident may come sooner than many of
104. N.Y. INSuRANcE LAW §183(1) (f) (Cum.Supp. 1958).
105. As pointed out in note 65, supra, both the N.J. and the Md. Fund Boards
include the Motor Veh. Comm. and the Supt. of Ins.
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us have heretofore thought possible. It is with that in mind that I would like to
devote the final part of this article to some thoughts on the future of MVAIC.
Planning Ahead
Is the problem of traffic damage solved thru an MVAIC, the loop holes in
which have been successfully plugged? Assume a 100 per cent insurance
coverage of liability based on fault. As;ume an absolutely impartial Corporation
seeking to adjust the loss. These assumptions are the most that ca 1 be asked of
our present system for handling the traffic victim. Will such a solution, can such
a solution, satisfy society in the year 1970?106 Obviously none of us knows. The
spectre of another system of compensation causes a former President of the New
York State Bar Association to worry:
It is no exaggeration to say that if the automobile litigation is lost,
the American trial lawyer will be a dead duck, and the entire profession
will suffer damage from which I don't think it will ever recover. Whether
the danger is real or imminent is difficult to say, but we do know that
recently the storm clouds have been gathering slowly but steadily.'07
I doubt if the American public is as concerned with the self-serving declara-
tions of the so-called trial bar as it is with the plight of the traffic victim and
society. 08
The non-fault compensation solution recommended by the Columbia Report
in 1932 is but one alternate proposal that has no where been completely acceptable;
nor, I think, because of the argument that it may make some lawyers poorer but
because of inherent defects in any plan applying to traffic problems the same
solutions as those offered for industrial accidents. As pointed out earlier, various
programs of voluntary and compulsory insurance are being offered in different
jurisdictions. Plans that seem called for during periods of vast national economic
depression no longer appeal in periods of general economic prosperity. Solutions
designed for a traffi count of 25 million motor vehicles may be inadequate for
65 million. What happens when the count reaches 100 million? Assessing fault
on the basis of one car going through a stop sign and colliding with another may
be far different from the six, eight or ten car collisions on today and tomorrow's
multilane speedways. Administrative and judicial procedures that were capable
of handling X number of litigants break down before the deluge of 1oX.
106. See Willcox, Karlen and Roemer, Justic Lost-By What Apellate
Papers Cost, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 934 (1958).
107. Ryan, L.C., Where Do We Go From Here With Tort Litigation? N.Y.
STATE BAR BULL. 288 (July 1958).
108. An eloquent plea has been entered by Dean Green on behalf of the
traffic victim together with a well-thought-out proposal for handling the traffic
problem. GREEN, TRAFFIC VtcTIxis, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958).
THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION
Should the vehicle and highway engineers be given a greater responsibility
than heretofore in attacking this problem as we consider that motor vehicles
designed to cruise at 80 m.p.h. will travel 50 feet before the average driver even
realizes a potential peril and hundreds of feet more before he can do anything
about it? Is it possible to handle the minor personal injury and property damage
case under one procedure and the major ones another way? Can society continue
to afford the cost of conscious pain and suffering as an element of damage in
traffic cases? Society has refused to recognize it in other situations. Perhaps the
detriment of that hazard may most economically be borne by the one suffering it
Should each member of society be required to act as a coinsurer for losses exceedin%
certain amounts? In determining a dollar indemnity should all collateral sources
of income be considered, including tax advantages?
More than a quarter of a century has passed since the last comprehensive
non-political study was made of the traffic situation in New York State. How
fortunate we are, here in New York, to be heading into a near-term period in
which financial protection for the traffic victim is as adequate as it is now. But the
motor vehicles are still coming off the assembly lines at the rate of 6 million a year.
Over the next two decades our population will probably show an increase of
90 million people. This would seem to be a most appropriate time for another
intensive, non-political study looking to solutions beyond the near-term.10 9 The
financing of such a research project well might be considered within the ambit
of one of the great charitable foundations. The group making the study should be
members of many disciplines-legislators, traffic engineers, mechanical engineers,
lawyers, city planners, jurists, insurance actuaries, medical experts, business admin:
istrators, perhaps even professors-men and women whose training and experience
qualify them to offer contributions to a problem, the magnitude of which
transcends the limits of any one particular discipline.
A final solution to the traffic problem cannot be hoped for now or in the
foreseeable future. However, continuous, intelligent and cooperative efforts
directed at reducing to a minimum the hardships brought about by the motor
vehicle should ameliorate most of the major irritants in this tremendous social
phenomenon. With the immediate pressures removed by the Compulsory Insur-
ance Law, as supplemented by the MVAIC, long-range research should be most
effective. The time to plan is now.
109. Harvard University has just received an $809,000 Federal grant for a
"grave-to-cradle study of fatal automobile accidents ... The study will be made
by a fourteen-member team from the Department of Legal Medicine of the
Harvard Medical School." N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1958, p. 68, col. 1.
